

BOTSWANA ~ REVISITING THE PULA 'CARRY' TRADE

Performance Review

Through October 31, the trade we initially recommended last January has delivered impressive results:

- ★ Short-term nominal rates have remained high and are currently at 12.79%. This has made it possible to roll the 91-day position with a minimum give-up in yield, producing an unlevered holding-period return of 10.49% in local currency.
- ★ Meanwhile the resurgent *Pula* has continued to strengthen against the US\$, appreciating by 16.92% over the period under review.
- ★ The combined effect of these two benign elements has been a **9-month total return of 29.18% in US\$, equivalent to an annualized return of 39.02%** - for a single-A credit (Moody's; S&P's).

Is the game over?



Emphatically not. Our assessment is that Botswana's economic fundamentals as well as the uncertain outlook for the US\$ mean that this trade still has legs.

Economic Backdrop

- As we have consistently argued, the inflationary spike of 2002 has proved attributable to a trio of one-time events ~ primarily, the July 1 introduction of a V.A.T. Chart 1 illustrates the **rapid deceleration in prices** from the 9½ year peak of 12.23% hit in May 2003 to October's reading of 7.0%.

- While nominal interest rates have come off their peak, the decline has been very modest. Our view is that the Bank of Botswana will be far less aggressive¹ about cutting rates than the Reserve Bank of South Africa. As can be seen from Chart 2, the BoB has a **naturally restrictive bias**. This is understandable given the currency peg arrangement by which the *Pula* is managed.

- We feel that this natural inclination will be reinforced by the fiscal slippage experienced last year, when the budget registered a deficit equal to 3.8% of GDP². While the budget performance during the first quarter of the current fiscal year showed a significant improvement³, we believe that the monetary stance will remain tight and **do not see nominal rates falling below 12%** even in the medium term - a view supported by the evidence of past practice, as illustrated.



¹ The Bank has only cut overnight rates once this cycle, to 14.75%.

² This was only the third time in 21 years that the government had posted a deficit.
³ i.e. a 41% reduction in the deficit, compared to the same April-June period last year.

Currency Outlook

As will be recalled, the *Pula* is managed against a currency basket that is dominated by the *Rand*. Botswana's net international investment position⁴ and foreign reserve levels⁵ mean that there can be no question about the credibility of its currency peg. In fact, the only real source of uncertainty is the *Rand*, on whose near-term prospects we remain positive.

- Chart 3 indicates that the South African currency has completely recovered from the sell-off experienced in late 2001. For this reason, some observers have argued since mid-April⁶ that the *Rand* and, by extension, the *Pula*, are well into 'overshoot' territory. We are not convinced.

- In the first place, we feel that there has been something of a *virtuous cycle* at work in the South African economy, with the appreciating *Rand* producing a rapid decline in inflation, thereby enabling policy-makers to cut rates aggressively, which is attracting additional investment inflows.

- There is also a powerful exogenous factor to consider. The near-explicit abandon by U.S. policy-makers of the '*strong dollar*' policy has improved the bid for precious metals. This, in turn, has driven up the value of gold-based currencies like the *Rand* and the Australian dollar, as illustrated in Chart 4. It is no coincidence that, over the period January-October, these two currencies' spot rates against the US\$ exhibit a correlation of 0.80.

- As at the 11/14/03 close, the *Pula/Rand* cross-rate stood at 1.4729, i.e. 1.54 standard deviations below the average rate (and median value) of BWP=R1.60 observed over the last 24 months⁷. This will provide a *powerful shock-absorber* in the event of a significant pull-back by the *Rand*, as was observed during the speculative assault against the South African currency in 2001-Q4⁸.



⁴ i.e. in excess of 100% of GDP.

⁵ i.e. equivalent to approximately 26 months of import cover.

⁶ When the *Rand* first tested the US\$1=R7 mark.

⁷ The current level is only 0.05σ above the minimum value (i.e. 1.4694) observed during the 24-month period in question.

⁸ During this period, which saw the *Rand* lose almost one third of its value, BoB allowed the cross-rate to strengthen from 1.50 to 1.71 - with the result that the *Pula* depreciated by only about 15% against the dollar (see Chart 3, above). There is also reason to believe that BoB has since reduced the *Rand*'s weight in the currency basket.



Although the statements of fact in this Report have been obtained from, and are based upon sources that Rhombus Advisors LLC believes to be reliable, the Firm does not guarantee their accuracy, and any such information may be incomplete or condensed. All opinions and forecasts included in this Report represent the Firm's judgement as of the date of the Report and are subject to change without notice. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Investment in non-US securities by US investors may entail certain risks, including possible loss of the principal invested.