

CROSS-BORDER COCOA UPDATE: COTE D'IVOIRE/GHANA

Chickens coming home to roost

The article that appeared in the Feb. 26th edition of [La Tribune d'Afrique](#) was so totally wide of the mark as to be laughable, viz.:

“Le ministère des Finances a annoncé pour sa part que les agriculteurs verront leurs subventions baisser de 30% dès la prochaine récolte.”

This was *pure fantasy*. As readers will recall from our [research note](#) a month ago, the Ghanaian authorities are nowhere close to grasping this politically sensitive nettle. However, it is clear that *this relatively obscure issue is gradually moving towards centre-stage ...*

- 1) There is much to suggest that Abdelmalek Alaoui, the paper’s Moroccan publisher who has excellent connections in Abidjan, was actually **broadcasting the aspirations of the Ivorian authorities** on the cocoa price asymmetry¹.
- 2) Indeed, contacts at **Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa regulator**, with whom we have shared some of our research on the subject², have quietly advised that they themselves produced a ‘confidential’ study that arrived at the same disturbing conclusions. **Their preoccupation with the cross-border price arbitrage** - and the consequent smuggling of Ivorian cocoa beans into Ghana - **was palpable**.
- 3) The extent of these concerns became clear on Feb. 27th, when data from the Conseil du Café-Cacao (CCC), as reviewed and [reported by Bloomberg](#), appeared to indicate Côte d’Ivoire has **lost approximately 9% of the cocoa harvested** since the crop year began last October.

We have warned previously that these diversions **do more than cannibalize fiscal receipts and export revenues**³; they cause **Ivorian exporters to fail on forward contracts** to deliver cocoa⁴, with a knock-on effect on the local lenders funding these operations.

- 4) This caveat was vindicated last Friday, when the CCC acknowledged having **sold forward approximately 170,000 tonnes**⁵ **more cocoa than it currently expects to produce** during the current crop season⁶.

The principal explanation offered for this shortfall is “poor” weather – a rationale that flies in the face of the recent jubilation at the **resumption of “heavier-than normal rains across the cocoa-producing region”**, following “a relatively mild Harmattan season”⁷.

¹ On which the two governments are notionally addressing in a Joint Ministerial Committee established in Dec. 2017.

² I.e. [“COCOBOD’s largesse will have unintended consequences”](#), Oct. 5, 2017.

³ See [“Backing away from the third rail”](#), Jan. 29, 2018.

⁴ Typically at least 70% of Côte d’Ivoire’s crop is sold via forward contracts.

⁵ This is an almost exact match of the 180,000 MT figure built into the Rhombus model estimating the prospective volume of Ivorian beans entering the Ghanaian supply chain.

⁶ As reported in [“Ivory Coast oversold cocoa main crop, CCC officials say”](#), posted by [Reuters](#), Mar. 1, 2018.

⁷ As reported in [“Ivory Coast Cocoa Farmers Get Relief as Rains Return Early”](#), posted by [Bloomberg](#); Feb. 26, 2018.

5) The iron laws of double-entry accounting mean that Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa shortfall must have a cross-border corollary in the form of an unbudgeted Ghanaian 'windfall' whose true costs are yet to be made public⁸.

This could become a significant bone of contention in Accra - at a time when the IMF is reportedly pressuring the Government to boost fiscal revenues by at least 0.5% of GDP⁹ – i.e. approximately USD 235 million.

⁸ As will have been seen, our own forecast is that by the end of the season, Cocobod will have spent approximately USD 600 million (1.29% of GDP) on unbudgeted cocoa procurement, of which smuggled Ivorian beans will have been responsible for almost USD 340 million of this total.

⁹ See "[IMF tells Ghana to adopt new revenue plan before April review](#)", posted by [Reuters](#), Mar. 2, 2018.

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